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Abstract:  
How might retirees consider deploying the retirement assets accumulated in a defined 
contribution pension plan? One possibility would be to purchase an immediate annuity. 
Another approach, called the “phased withdrawal” strategy in the literature, would have the 
retiree invest his funds and then withdraw some portion of the account annually. Using this 
second tactic, the withdrawal rate might be determined according to a fixed benefit level 
payable until the retiree dies or the funds run out, or it could be set using a variable formula, 
where the retiree withdraws funds according to a rule linked to life expectancy.  Using a range 
of data consistent with the German experience, we evaluate several alternative designs for 
phased withdrawal strategies, allowing for endogenous asset allocation patterns, and also 
allowing the worker to make decisions both about when to retire and when to switch to an 
annuity. We show that one particular phased withdrawal rule is appealing since it offers 
relatively low expected shortfall risk, good expected payouts for the retiree during his life, 
and some bequest potential for the heirs. We also find that unisex mortality tables if used for 
annuity pricing can make women’s expected shortfalls higher, expected benefits higher, and 
bequests lower under a phased withdrawal program. Finally, we show that delayed 
annuitization can be appealing since it provides higher expected benefits with lower expected 
shortfalls, at the cost of somewhat lower anticipated bequests. 
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Policy Summary 
 
Retirees often face the question of how to draw down assets that they have accumulated over their 
worklives. Many recommend that people should purchase a life annuity to protect them against lon-
gevity risk, but here we explore an alternative strategy called a “self-annuitization” or phased with-
drawal approach. Here the retiree allocates his funds across various asset categories (e.g. equity, 
bonds, cash) and periodically withdraws a portion of the invested funds for consumption purposes. 
The advantage of such a phased withdrawal strategy, as compared to a life annuity, is that it offers 
greater liquidity, the possibility of greater consumption while alive as well as the possibility of be-
queathing some of the assets in the event of early death. Yet relying on income from assets without 
any insurance provides no pooling of longevity risk.  
 
Our paper explores several alternative withdrawal rules that rely not on some fixed amount per pe-
riod, but rather on consuming a specified fraction of the remaining fund wealth each period. This 
alternative approach avoids the risk of outliving one’s total assets, as long as the benefit-to-wealth 
ratio is lower than one. Nevertheless, due to stochastic investment returns, the value of the pension 
accounts assets change over time implying that the periodically withdrawn amount must vary in 
tandem – and it could be substantially lower or higher than the benefit payable under a life annuity. 
To evaluate different decumulation options on a quantitative basis, we adopt a risk-value (or risk-
return) model which uses an explicit measure of risk, an explicit measure of value, and a function 
reflecting the trade-offs between value and risk.  
 
Most relevant to policymakers is our finding that mandating annuitization after a phased withdrawal 
period can be quite appealing in terms of risk. This is of particular interest since this approach has 
recently been implemented in both the UK and Germany; some annuitization has also been recom-
mended by the US Commission to Strengthen Social Security. We also find that requiring unisex 
tables for annuity pricing exposes women to potentially greater risk.  Finally, our results speak to 
the asset mix retirees will optimally want to hold: later annuitization (say, at age 85) would imply a 
larger fraction of the financial assets would be held in bonds. 
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Executive Summary 
 
Retirees often face the issue of how to draw down assets that they have accumulated over their 
worklives. While economists often recommend that they purchase a life annuity, which covers them 
against longevity risk,  these financial instruments have some disadvantages. A buyer faces loss of 
liquidity and control over his assets, and in many cases annuities do not leave money for bequests.  
By contrast, in some European countries, policymakers have permitted alternative income with-
drawal patterns for asset pools dedicated to old-age consumption. This paper focuses on rules simi-
lar to those adopted in Germany under the so-called “Riester  plans,” where some portion of the 
funds can be taken as a lump-sum and some other portion must be annuitized. Similar rules are in 
place in the UK and in Canada.   
 
A key aspect of the retiree’s decision during the payout phase is how to invest his or her retirement 
plan assets, and also how payouts should be structured so as to balance consumption flows versus 
bequest intentions without running out of money. We explore an alternative strategy to buying a life 
annuity called a “self-annuitization” or phased withdrawal approach. Here the retiree allocates his 
funds across various asset categories (e.g. equity, bonds, cash) and periodically withdraws a portion 
of the invested funds for consumption purposes. The advantage of such a phased withdrawal strat-
egy, as compared to a life annuity, is that it offers greater liquidity, the possibility of greater con-
sumption while alive as well as the possibility of bequeathing some of the assets in the event of 
early death. Yet relying on income from assets without any insurance provides no pooling of lon-
gevity risk. Consequently, if the retiree constantly consumes an equal amount from his account, he 
could outlive his assets before his uncertain date of death, particularly in the event of long-run low 
investment returns. We develop several alternative withdrawal rules that rely not on some fixed 
amount per period, but rather on consuming a specified fraction of the remaining fund wealth each 
period. This alternative approach avoids the risk of outliving one’s total assets, as long as the bene-
fit-to-wealth ratio is lower than one. Nevertheless, due to stochastic investment returns, the value of 
the pension accounts assets change over time implying that the periodically withdrawn amount must 
vary in tandem – and it could be substantially lower or higher than the benefit payable under a life 
annuity. 
 
So as to evaluate the different decumulation options on a quantitative basis, we introduce a formal 
risk/return framework for decision making under uncertainty. Here we adopt a risk-value (or risk-
return) model which uses an explicit measure of risk, an explicit measure of value, and a function 
reflecting the trade-offs between value and risk. Since retirees will tend to prefer more return to 
less, and less risk to more, other things equal, we can derive a partial-ordering of opportunities 
within a risk-return dominance context. Whereas previous studies have focused on the probability 
of consumption shortfall as the operative risk measure, we extend the literature in several directions. 
First, we examine the risk and return profiles of several variable self-annuitization strategies that 
provide payments according to predetermined benefit-to-wealth ratio. Second, we address a major  
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shortcoming of the shortfall-probability risk measure, namely that it ignores the size of the possible 
loss that may be experienced. In practice, of course, both theoretical and empirical arguments sug-
gest that investors take both the probability and the amount of a possible shortfall into considera-
tion. Our contribution is to go beyond prior work by looking not only at the probability of a con-
sumption shortfall, but also consider the size of the shortfall when it occurs. Third, we examine how 
the results change if a mandatory annuitization rule were imposed akin to those in the recent Ger-
man and UK pension regulation. Fourth, we evaluate the impact of allowing the annuitization date 
to be endogenous, along with the asset allocation decision. We illustrate how the risk of a consump-
tion shortfall and return profiles of fixed and variable phased withdrawal strategies compare to the 
life annuity, and indicate what dominant strategies might be. 
 
Our analysis shows that a phased withdrawal strategy paying the same benefit as the annuity ex-
poses retirees to the risk of outliving their assets while still alive. A phased withdrawal plan using a 
fixed benefit-to-wealth ratio avoids the risk of running out of money, since benefits fluctuate in tan-
dem with the pension fund’s value. But a fixed benefit withdrawal rule affords lower risk than vari-
able withdrawal rules, if one uses a mortality-weighted shortfall-risk measure (which includes both 
shortfall probability and magnitude of loss). We also show that mandatory deferred annuitization 
with a fixed withdrawal rule can enhance expected payouts and cut expected shortfall risk but at the 
cost of reduced expected bequests, as compared to no annuity. For a variable withdrawal plan, a 
simple deferred annuitization may not reduce risk: rather, it requires optimization of the benefit to 
wealth ratio. We further explore using an 1/E(T) phased withdrawal rule, which offers relatively 
low expected shortfall risk, good expected payouts for the retiree during his life, and some bequest 
potential for his heirs. But if mandatory annuities are combined with this phased withdrawal plan, 
we find the 1/E(T) rule to be less attractive. We also find that the optimized 1/T rule and the fixed 
benefit rule both have appealing risk characteristics, particularly when combined with a mandatory 
deferred annuity. 
 
Relevant to policymakers is our finding that mandating annuitization after a phased withdrawal pe-
riod can be quite appealing in terms of risk. This is of particular interest since this approach has 
recently been implemented in both the UK and Germany.  A degree of mandated annuitization has 
also proposed for the US by the recent Commission to Strengthen Social Security in the US context. 
The present paper also implies that a government mandate requiring that unisex tables be adopted 
for annuity pricing (as in the UK) exposes women who elected a phased withdrawal plan to greater 
risk.  Finally, our results have implications for the asset mix retirees will optimally want to hold: 
later annuitization (say, at age 85) would imply a larger fraction of the financial assets would be 
held in bonds. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In retirement, many people face the question of how to draw down assets that they have accumu-
lated over their worklives. Economists often suggest that a sensible approach is to purchase a life 
annuity. An annuity is a financial contract between an insured person and an insurance company 
“that pays out a periodic amount for as long as the annuitant is alive, in exchange for an initial pre-
mium” (Brown et al., 2001: p. 1). The payments may be fixed in nominal terms (fixed annuity), or 
they might rise at a pre-specified fixed nominal escalation rate (graded annuity), or they could be 
indexed to inflation (real annuity) keeping the retiree’s standard of living constant. Alternatively, 
they might reflect the return of a specific asset portfolio which backs the (variable) annuity, or they 
can depend on the insurance company’s experience with mortality, investment returns, and ex-
penses (participating annuity). As Mitchell et al. (1999) note, the essential attraction of a life annu-
ity is that the individual is protected against the risk of outliving his own assets, given uncertainty 
about his remaining lifetime, by pooling longevity risk across a group of annuity purchasers. Yaari 
(1965) shows that risk-averse retirees without a bequest motive facing annuity markets that charge 
actuarially fair premiums, should annuitize 100 percent of their wealth. 
 
Though life annuities provide invaluable longevity insurance that cannot be replicated by pure in-
vestment vehicles, they also have some disadvantages. First, the purchaser faces loss of liquidity 
and control over his assets, because the lump sum premium cannot be recovered after purchase of 
the annuity, irrespective of special needs (e.g. to cover unexpected expenditures for uninsured 
medical costs).
1 Second, in its simplest form, where income payments are contingent on the individ-
ual’ s survival, there is no chance of leaving money for heirs, even in the case of the annuitant’s 
early death. Other explanations for why individuals will be reluctant to buy annuities are the high 
administrative costs levied by insurance companies (Mitchell et al., 1999), the ability to pool lon-
gevity risk within families (Brown and Poterba, 2000; Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981), and the presence 
of other annuitized resources from Social Security or employer-sponsored defined benefits plans 
(Munnell et al., 2002).  
 
Recent developments in European pension systems have focused attention on alternative income 
withdrawal patterns for asset pools dedicated to old-age consumption. In Germany, so-called “Ri-
ester  plans” offer tax inducements for voluntary saving in individual pension accounts (IPA) during 
the worklife, underscoring the government’s interest in boosting asset accumulation in an aging 
population (Börsch-Supan et al., 2003a, b). When the age of retirement is reached, twenty percent 
of the accumulated assets in the IPA can be taken as a lump-sum distribution. The rest must be 
drawn down in the form of a lifelong annuity (offered by a commercial insurance company) or a 
phased withdrawal plan (typically offered by mutual fund and/or bank providers) which must partly 
revert into an annuity at the age of 85.
 In the UK, personal pensions have also grown in popularity 
                                                 
1 See Brugiavini  (1993) for a theoretical model in which the health status of the retiree is stochastic.  
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(Blake et al., 2003). As in Germany, a portion of the accumulated asset can be taken as a lump sum, 
while with the rest, one is legally obliged to buy an annuity by the age of 75. In Canada, at age 69 
retirees must either buy an annuity with their tax-sheltered savings or create a discretionary man-
aged withdrawal plan (Milevsky and Robinson, 2000). In the US, no compulsory annuitization is 
required for 401(k) plans at retirement; instead, many workers roll over their funds as a lump sum 
into an Individual Retirement Account which manage themselves in old age. Though some re-
searchers have explored aspects of the accumulation phase in these accounts (e.g. Maurer and 
Schlag, 2003; Blake et al., 2001), thus far, relatively little attention has been devoted to the payout 
phase.  
 
A key aspect of the retiree’s decumulation process is the decision of how to invest these retirement 
plan assets and how to structure payouts during the retirement period, so as to best balance con-
sumption flows versus bequest intentions without running out of money. An alternative strategy to 
buying a life annuity is associated with what has been called “self-annuitization” or phased with-
drawal approach (c.f. Milevsky and Robinson, 2000). At retirement, the wealth endowment is allo-
cated across various asset categories (e.g. equity, bonds, cash) typically included in a family of mu-
tual funds where the assets will earn uncertain rates of return. A certain amount of the invested 
funds can then be withdrawn periodically for consumption purposes. The particular advantage of 
such a phased withdrawal strategy, as compared to the life annuity, is that it offers greater liquidity, 
the possibility of greater consumption while alive as well as the possibility of bequeathing some of 
the assets in the event of early death. On the other hand, relying on income flows withdrawn di-
rectly from an IRA without any insurance provides no pooling of longevity risk. Consequently, if 
the retiree constantly consumes an equal amount from his account, he could outlive his assets before 
his uncertain date of death, particularly in the event of long-run low investment returns. An alterna-
tive withdrawal rule is to not take out some fixed amount per period, but rather to consume a speci-
fied fraction of the remaining fund wealth each period. This second strategy, in contrast to the fixed 
withdrawal technique, avoids the risk of outliving one’s total assets, as long as the benefit-to-wealth 
ratio is lower than one. Nevertheless, due to stochastic investment returns, the value of the pension 
accounts assets change over time implying that the periodically withdrawn amount must vary in 
tandem – and it could be substantially lower or higher than the benefit payable under a life annuity. 
 
To be able to evaluate the different decumulation options on a quantitative basis, it is necessary to 
introduce a formal risk/return framework for decision-making under uncertainty. The standard ap-
proach in financial economics is to maximize the expected discounted value of a (time separable) 
utility function for uncertain future benefits and (if necessary) for a bequest. For example, Blake et 
al. (2003) use a utility function of the constant relative risk class (CRRA), to evaluate different 
withdrawals plans assuming mandatory annuitization is required at age 75. Milevsky and Young 
(2003) use a similar objective function to determine the value of the option to defer annuitization. A 
shortcoming of such an approach, especially in the practical world, is that the decision-maker rarely 
has explicit measures of risk preferences without knowing the shape of his utility function. As Pye 
2000 pointed out, “neither endowment fund managers nor financial planners are using these models 
to help make decisions”. As a result, risk-value (or risk-return) models of choice have the advantage 
of developing an explicit measure of risk, an explicit measure of value, and a function reflecting the 
trade-offs between value and risk. Clearly, individuals prefer more return to less and less risk to 
more, other things equal. This property allows a partial-ordering of opportunities within a risk-
return dominance context, even if the exact preference weights for the risk and return tradeoff are 
unknown. Depending on which risk metric is selected and how the trade-off between risk and return  
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is formulated, a risk-value model can but need not be consistent with the expected utility approach 
of choice (Sarin and Weber 1993).
2 
 
In this paper, we take a risk-value approach, whereby the “return” is the expected level of benefits 
as well as the expected possibility of bequest, and the “risk” is the possibility of not reaching a 
benchmark or desired level of consumption. Previous studies taking this tack focus on the probabil-
ity of consumption shortfall as the operative risk measure.
3 Assuming that the retiree consumes a 
fixed real amount at specific points in time from a self-managed pension account, these authors cal-
culate the probability of running out of money before the uncertain date of death using alternative 
assumption about the asset allocation, the initial consumption-to-wealth ratio, and the optimal wait-
ing time before switching the retirement wealth into an annuity. Our work extends this literature in 
several directions. First, we examine the risk and return profiles of several variable self-
annuitization strategies that provide payments according to predetermined benefit-to-wealth ratio. 
Second, we address a major shortcoming of the shortfall-probability risk measure, namely that it 
ignores the size of the possible loss that may be experienced. In practice, of course, both theoretical 
and empirical arguments suggest that investors take both the probability and the amount of a possi-
ble shortfall into consideration. Our contribution is to go beyond prior work by looking not only at 
the probability of a consumption shortfall, but also consider the size of the shortfall when it occurs. 
Third, we examine how the results change if a mandatory annuitization rule were imposed akin to 
those in the recent German and UK pension regulation. Fourth, we evaluate the impact of allowing 
the annuitization date to be endogenous, along with the asset allocation decision. We illustrate how 
the risk of a consumption shortfall and return profiles of fixed and variable phased withdrawal 
strategies compare to the life annuity, and indicate what dominant strategies might be. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The next section describes several differ-
ent withdrawal strategies. To illustrate their implications, we assume conditions with respect to 
capital and insurance markets products and pricing found in the German annuity and capital mar-
ketplace. We adopt these so as to be informative about alternative payout options that might be con-
templated under the German Riester  plans when they reach maturity. Most results focus on an age-
65 male retiree, but we also provide findings for other ages and for women. Section three reports 
results using a fixed asset allocation pattern, and Section four permits assets to be allocated opti-
mally. A final section summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2. The Case of Phased Withdrawal 
2.1 Withdrawal Plans with Fixed Benefits 
 
We assume that the retiree is endowed with an initial wealth of V0 that he can use to buy a single-
premium immediate life annuity paying constant annual real benefits B at the beginning of each 
year, for life with no bequest. We denote this as the benchmark annuity and refer the reader to Ap-
pendix A regarding the pricing of such an insurance product using assumption about mortality, 
                                                 
2 Perhaps the most widely used risk-return model in the area of finance is the classic mean-variance portfolio analysis 
elaborated by Markowitz (1952), which is, inter alia, consistent with a quadratic utility function (see Campbell and 
Viceira, 2002, p. 24). A general analysis of conditions regarding the compatibility of multiparameter trade-off models of 
choice with the expected utility model is given in Schneeweiß (1967). 
3See for instance Milevsky et al. (1997), Milevsky and Robinson (2000), Milevsky (1998, 2001), Ameriks et al. (2001), 
Pye (2000, 2001) and Albrecht and Maurer (2002).   
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loadings and interest rates to discount future annuity payments. If the retiree does not annuitize his 
wealth, he invests the retirement assets in various financial assets (e.g. equities, bonds, cash) typi-
cally represented by a family of mutual funds, and then he withdraws a certain amount at the begin-
ning of the year for consumption purposes. Throughout the paper, we assume that benefits are taxed 
as ordinary income; therefore taxes will not change the desirability of voluntary annuitization or 
systematic withdrawal from a self-managed retirement account.
4 
 
Under the fixed benefit rule, the retiree will sell at the beginning of each year as many fund units as 
required to reach the same yearly benefits paid by the life annuity, until either he dies, or the retire-
ment assets are exhausted. Formally, the benefits Bt at the beginning of each year are given by: 
  ) , min( t t V B B = ,   (1) 
where Vt is the value of the retirement accounts assets wealth at the beginning of year t (t = 0, 1, …) 
just before the withdrawal Bt for that year is made. The retiree faces an intertemporal budget con-
straint that wealth next period Vt+1 equals wealth today Vt, less what is subtracted for benefit pay-
ments Bt, times the (inflation adjusted) portfolio return Rt+1 over the period, or zero if the fund is 
exhausted: 
  .
. 0
) 1 )( (
) 1 ( ) (
1
1 1



≤
> + −
= + ⋅ − =
+
+ + B V
B V R B V
R B V V
t
t t t
t t t t   (2) 
Note that the benefit paid Bt depends on the value Vt of the retirement assets used to finance with-
drawals. If these assets are risky, the benefit payouts are exposed to uncertain capital market re-
turns. The idea of the fixed benefit rule is to replicate the income from a life annuity as long as the 
funds permit, while at the same time offering some bequest potential in the event of an early death. 
Nevertheless, the risk of the fixed benefit rule is that adverse capital markets linked to longevity 
outcomes might produce a situation where Vt hits zero and therefore Bt = Bt+1 = … = 0, while the 
retiree is still alive. 
 
 
 
2.2. Phased Withdrawal Rules with Variable Benefits 
 
Under a variable phased withdrawal plan, the retiree receives not a fixed benefit amount per period, 
but rather an ex ante fixed fraction of the retirement assets remaining each period. This benefit-
wealth ratio can be constant, increasing, or decreasing over time. Due to the stochastic nature of 
capital markets, the value of the retiree’s fund is exposed to positive as well as negative fluctua-
tions. Consequently, the level of benefit payments under a variable withdrawal plan also fluctuates 
in tandem with the accounts value. Depending on the withdrawal fraction and the realized returns of 
the retirement accounts assets, benefit payments could be substantially lower – or higher – than 
payments from a life annuity at some point during the post retirement phase. A variable phased 
withdrawal plan and a variable annuity have in common the fact that they pay pension benefits that 
vary with uncertain investment returns. Nevertheless, the former offers the possibility of bequeath-
ing the remaining value of the retirement account in the case of the retiree’s death, while the latter 
does not.  
                                                 
4 This is accurate for the German context; for more on annuity tax treatment in the US see Brown et al. (2001).  
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The path of benefits payable using a variable phased withdrawal rule can be formalized as follows. 
Let Vt be the value of the retirement assets at the beginning of period t (t = 0, 1, …) before the with-
drawal Bt for that year is made. At the beginning of every period t, an ex ante specified fraction ω t  
(0 < ω t ≤  1) is withdrawn from current wealth; hence the retiree receives a payment according to: 
  t t t V B ⋅ = ω   (3) 
Further let Rt+1 denote the return of the funds over the period. Then, the intertemporal budget con-
straint of the retirement account is given by: 
  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1 1 1 + + + + ⋅ ⋅ − = + ⋅ − = t t t t t t t R V R B V V ω . (4) 
If the retiree dies at the beginning of period t+1, Vt+1 represents the bequest potential for his heirs. 
Note that if the assets of the pension account are invested in risky assets (e.g. stocks and/or bonds), 
the returns are also uncertain, and therefore both the pension benefits Bt as well as the bequest po-
tential Vt are random variables.  
 
In what follows, we focus attention on three specific withdrawal rules that generate variable bene-
fits: the fixed percentage rule, the 1/T rule, and the 1/E(T) rule. Each is discussed in turn. 
 “Fixed Percentage” Withdrawal Rule: Here a constant fraction is withdrawn each period from 
the remaining fund wealth, i.e. the benefit-wealth ratio is fixed over time: 
  . ω ω = = t
t
t
V
B
  (5) 
This withdrawal rule has the advantage of simplicity, requiring no information regarding the maxi-
mum possible duration of the payout phase or the retiree’s characteristics (i.e. age, sex).  
"1/T Rule" Withdrawal Rule: The idea behind this rule is to set the withdrawal fraction according 
to the maximum possible duration of the plan, denoted by T. One way is to set T equal to the oldest 
age assumed in a mortality table; another is to fix it at the retiree’s life expectancy as of his retire-
ment date (Brown et al., 1999). In the first case, the maximum number of payments T is given by 
the limiting age l of the mortality table minus the current age of the retiree x plus one:  
  1 + − = x l T . (6) 
The retiree gets a fraction of 1/T of his initial pension account as the first payment, the second pay-
ment is worth 1/(T –1) of the remaining assets, and so forth until the retiree either passes away or 
reaches the plan’s limiting age l. Formally, the benefit-wealth ratio at the beginning of year t (t = 0, 
1, …T-1) of this retirement plan is given according to: 
  .
1
t T V
B
t
t
t
−
= = ω  (7) 
In contrast to the fixed percentage rule discussed above, the withdrawal fraction is not constant but 
rather increases with age. What this means is that the longer the retiree survives, the higher the 
withdrawal fraction will be. For example, if l = 110 and x = 65 the first withdrawal fraction at age 
65 is ω 0 = 1/46 = 2.17%, the second at age 66 is ω 1 = 1/45 =  2.22%, and at age 101 the benefit to 
wealth ratio is ω 101 = 10%. The rule pay out all of the remaining wealth of the retirement account 
(i.e. ω 110 = 100%) by the age of 110 – no bequest potential is left – in contrast to the fixed percent-
age rule.  
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“1/E[T(x)]" Withdrawal Rule: This rule, which we will call the 1/E(T) rule for short, takes into 
consideration the retiree’s remaining life expectancy in a dynamic way. Now the withdrawal frac-
tion is no longer determined by the maximum length of the plan, but instead by the retiree’s life 
expectancy remaining. Let t px represents the conditional probability that an x-year old man will 
attain age x + t, the complete expectation of life is calculated as:  
  [] ∑
−
=
= +
x l
t
x t p t x T
0
) ( E  (8) 
where l is the maximum age according to a mortality table. Then, for an at retirement x-year old 
man, the benefit-to-wealth ratio in period t after retirement, conditional on the fact that he is still 
alive, is given as: 
  .
)] ( E[
1
t x T V
B
t
t
t
+
= = ω   (9) 
The shorter his expected remaining lifetime, the higher the fraction he will withdrawal from his 
pension account. Therefore, the withdrawal fraction rises with the age of the retiree. Since the re-
tiree’s life expectancy is less than the maximum age of the mortality tables, the benefit-to-wealth 
ratio of the 1/E(T) rule exceeds that of the 1/T rule, in general. The 1/E(T) withdrawal rule is used 
in the US during the decumulation phase of 401(k) plans, where the tax authority seeks to ensure 
that retirees consume their tax-qualified pension accounts instead of leaving them as bequests for 
their heirs (see Munnell et al., 2002). 
 
 
3. Risk and Reward Analysis of Phased Withdrawal Plans Conditional on Survival 
3.1 Research Design 
 
To compare the risk and value characteristics of the four phased withdrawal rules, it is useful to 
begin with an assessment of expected payouts conditional on retiree survival (Section 4 generalizes 
results with mortality-weighted risk and reward computations). For the moment, therefore, we focus 
only on the risk resulting from capital markets and suppress mortality. To do so, we assume a 65-
year old male retiree who seeks to compare benefits under the four phased withdrawal plans given 
an initial asset balance. The plan assets are rebalanced annually to maintain an asset pool split 
evenly between stocks and bonds, consistent with recommendations by financial advisors (asset 
allocation is optimized in the next section).
5 We employ an annuitant mortality table provided by 
the German Society of Actuaries to calculate survival probabilities and expected lifetime (in the 
1/E(T) case). Since this table ends at age 110, we set l = 110 for the 1/T rule. For the fixed percent-
age withdrawal rule, we select ω  = 5.82%, since this benefit-to-wealth ratio produces an initial pay-
out equal to the life annuity in the first year of the plan. In the case of the fixed benefit rule, we as-
sume that the initial withdrawal continues until the retiree dies or the account is exhausted.  
 
                                                 
5 Feldstein et al. (2001) and Ibbotson (2003) assume that retirees hold their non-annuitized assets in a 60% stock, 40% 
bond portfolio. Here, for illustrative purposes, we use a more conservative 50-50 split, consistent with the position rec-
ommended by the President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security (see Cogan and Mitchell (2003)). Some finan-
cial advisers propose that investors hold equities equal to 100 minus their age; see Canner et al. (1997) or Vora and 
McGinnes (2000). The number 100 could (probably) be justified with the maximum age used in most population mor-
tality tables but we note that annuitant mortality tables generally have a maximum age of 10-15 years higher.   
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We next assess the risk and return patterns that emerge under these alternative phased withdrawal 
patterns (before taxes), compared to a fixed real annuity providing lifelong constant payouts. When 
focusing on risks and benefits, the computations either assume that the retiree is alive, or conversely 
we evaluate the bequest potential if the retiree is assumed to pass away at a specific age. To do so, 
we specify an exogenous structure on the ex-ante probability distribution governing the financial 
uncertainty of future returns and estimate the parameters of such a model from independent (e.g. 
yearly) historical observations of real returns. With such a model in place, it is possible to look into 
the future and compute the expected benefit payments and different shortfall-risk measures of the 
four withdrawal plans in which we are interested. Implementing it relies on the assumption that the 
stochastic specification of the asset values in the retirement account follows Geometric Brownian 
motion, a standard assumption in financial economics (which can be traced back to Bachellier, 
1900). This implies that the yearly log-returns are i.i.d. and normally distributed. We also use Ger-
man historical time series over the period 1967-2002 for the German Equity Index (DAX) and the 
German Bond Index (REXP) as proxies for stock and bond investments. The DAX represents an 
index portfolio of German blue-chip stocks, and the REXP represents a portfolio of German gov-
ernment bonds. Each of these indices is adjusted for capital gains as well as dividends and coupon 
payments (on a pre-tax basis). To account for potential administrative costs, we subtract the equiva-
lent of 0.5% p.a. from the yearly portfolio return.
6 Subsequently, asset returns are adjusted for infla-
tion by using the German Consumer Price Index.  
 
These yearly data produce estimates (before taxes) for the real log average rate of return, the volatil-
ity and the correlation-coefficients of stocks and bonds as reported in Appendix C: Since we assume 
normally distributed log returns, i.e. It = ln(1 + Rt) ~ N(µ, σ ), these parameters imply a real log av-
erage rate of return on the fifty-fifty stock-bond portfolio of µ = 5.52 percent with a standard devia-
tion of σ = 13.78 %. Note that this produces an expected gross rate of return of E(1 + Rt) = 
E[exp(It)] = exp[0.0552 + 0.5*0.1378²] = 1.066.  
 
Assuming that the normality property also holds for the log portfolio returns,
7 it is straightforward 
to develop an analytical closed form solution for the probability distribution of future benefits of the 
different variable phased withdrawal rules since the intertemporal budget constraint given in equa-
tion (4) is (log)linear (see Appendix B for details). However, because the value of the retirement 
accounts value might hit zero, the intertemporal budget constraint in equation (2) for the fixed bene-
fit rule is not (log)linear, and future benefits are path-dependent. Hence, even under the assumption 
of independent and identically distributed log portfolio returns, for the fixed benefits withdrawal 
plan the probability distribution of future benefits is unknown. Therefore, to obtain estimates for the 
different risk and return measure we use Monte-Carlo simulation to generate a large number (i.e. 
100,000) of paths for the evolution of the withdrawal plan.
8 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Feldstein et al. (2001) p. 60 use a similar procedure to account for administration costs. 
7 This assumption is widely used in strategic asset allocation (e.g. Feldstein et al. (2001) or Campbell and Viceira 
(2002)) and can be justified by a Taylor approximation of the nonlinear function relating log-individual-asset returns to 
log portfolio returns. For full details see Campbell and Viceira (2002), p. 28-29 and Campbell et al. (2001). 
8 Milevsky and Robinson (2000) have developed an analytical approximation method based on moment-matching tech-
niques and the reciprocal gamma distribution and therefore can avoid Monte Carlo-simulation.   
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3.2  Analysis of Expected Benefits 
 
Figure 1 depicts the Expected Benefits profiles conditional on survival, for the four phased with-
drawal rules, as compared to the annuity profile. Focusing on the fixed benefit rule shows that in the 
first year, mean benefits are (by construction) equal to the annuity benefit. However, in the follow-
ing years, the expected payments from the plan are decreasing, reflecting the risk of running out of 
money. The fixed fraction rule also starts with a benefit equal to the life annuity payout, and after 
that, mean benefits slightly rise as the retiree ages. This is due to the fact that the pension account’s 
expected gross rate of return is 6.66% p.a., which exceeds the constant benefit-to-wealth-ratio of 
5.82% p.a. (i.e. 1.066*(1-0.0582) = 1.004 > 1).    
 
Figure 1 here 
 
By contrast, the 1/T rule pays a much lower expected benefit up to the age of 80, but thereafter, the 
expected benefit rises extremely quickly and to very high levels, reaching almost 700% of the annu-
ity payment late in life. This can be explained by the low withdrawal fractions of this rule during the 
first part of the retirement plan. Up to age 95, the benefit-to-wealth ratio is lower than the expected 
rate of return (i.e. 6.66%); consequently, the expected value of the pension assets grows over time. 
“Reserves” built up in earlier ages can be used to increase the expected benefits in later years. The 
1/E(T) rule starts at a level of about 85% of the annuity payment and increases to 100% if the retiree 
reaches age 70. This payout approach reaches its maximum expected payment of about 150% at age 
of 83. After this age, the expected payments are monotonously decreasing, reaching the level of the 
life annuity at age 91. At ages older than 100, following the 1/E(T) rule would leave the retiree very 
exposed to quite low benefits, asymptotically approaching 0. Note that the withdrawal fraction un-
der the 1/E(T) rule is higher than under the 1/T rule. Only for the first six years of the retirement 
plan will the benefit-to-wealth ratio be lower than the expected return earned on pension assets. If 
the retiree survives until age 71, his expected lifetime is about 15 years, resulting in a withdrawal 
fraction of 6.66% which is about the same as the expected rate of return. Beyond that age, the with-
drawal fraction grows ever larger than the expected asset returns backing benefit payments. For 
some time (i.e. up to age 83), the increasing withdrawal fractions produce increasing expected bene-
fits. But because less and less wealth is left in the fund, at some point (here age 83) the expected 
benefit amounts decrease although the withdrawal fraction increases. 
 
3.3. Shortfall Risk Analysis 
3.3.1 Shortfall Probability 
 
In accordance with other fields of research, as well as with conventional wisdom, shortfall risk is 
associated with the possibility of “something bad happening”, in other words, falling below a re-
quired target return. Returns below the target (losses) are considered to be undesirable or risky, 
while returns above the target (gains) are desirable or non-risky. In this sense, shortfall-risk-
measures are called “relative” or “pure” measures of risk.
9  To analyze this risk in the case of our 
                                                 
9 The concept of shortfall risk was introduced in the area of finance by Roy (1952) and Kataoka (1963), and it was ex-
panded and theoretically justified by Bawa (1975) and Fishburn (1977, 1982, 1984). It was widely applied to invest-
ment asset allocation by Leibowitz et al. (1996) and used by Leibowitz and Krasker (1988) and Maurer and Schlag 
(2003) among others to judge the long term risk of stocks and bonds. In addition Libby and Fishburn (1977); Kahneman  
and Tversky (1979); Laughhuun et al. (1980) and March and Shapira (1987) show that in empirical business decision-
making, many individuals judge the risk of an alternative relative to a reference point.  
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phased withdrawal strategies, we employ several different shortfall risk measures. We begin with 
the shortfall probability, defined as: 
  SP(Bt) = P(Bt < z). (10) 
This measures the probability that the periodic withdrawal Bt is smaller than a chosen benchmark z, 
which is here the payment provided by the life annuity. 
 
Figure 2 depicts the Shortfall Probability for the fixed benefit rule, the fixed fraction rule (5.82%), 
the 1/T approach and the 1/E(T) rule, as compared to the annuity benefit. In the first year, all the 
strategies except the fixed benefit program face a high probability of shortfall, and the only reason 
the fixed benefit approach does not is that it is set by construction to pay the initial annuity value as 
long as the funds have not been exhausted. The fixed benefit program offers a Shortfall Probability 
close to zero at the beginning of the retirement period, but this risk metric  begins to rise over time, 
reaching about 20% around age 85. By contrast, both the 1/T and 1/E(T) rules have very high short-
fall probabilities early in the retirement period. This is because a retiree investing his assets in a 
mutual fund hoping to generate the same payment offered by the life annuity must withdraw about 
6.50% of the fund annually. But the withdrawal fractions under the 1/T and the 1/E(T) rules are 
smaller early in retirement, meaning that the wealth remaining grows quickly. Consequently the 
shortfall probability declines over time, though the withdrawal fraction is growing. The retiree that 
withdraws a fixed fraction each year faces a risk profile that is remarkably high for all ages. In early 
years, the probability of receiving a benefit below the benchmark life annuity is about 50%, gradu-
ally increasing to about 60% at the end of the period.
10    
 
Figure 2 here 
 
Another interesting finding has to do with the gradient of the Shortfall Probability under the 1/E(T) 
rule. Early in the retirement period there is a very fast decline in this risk, but if the retiree is still 
alive at age 83, the SP begins to rise very quickly due to the special construction of this spending 
rule. In contrast to the 1/T rule, expected payments at the beginning of the plan are already higher, 
meaning that few “reserves” are built up in the beginning of the plan. Also, the 65-year-old retiree 
has an expected remaining lifetime of 19 years, and his expected remaining lifetime decreases over 
time, especially after the age of 80. The shorter is the remaining expected lifetime, the more wealth 
will be withdrawn in the 1/E(T) case. As the withdrawal fractions increase, less and less wealth is 
left in the fund; at some point, wealth remaining is insufficient to provide high enough payments, so 
the shortfall probability again increases.  
 
                                                 
10 This results from the lognormal distribution of future benefits which become increasingly skewed to the right, the 
longer the retiree remains alive. Note that the expected level return (i.e. exp(0.0552 + 0.5*0.1378²) - 1 = 6.66%) of the 
retirement account assets is greater than the withdrawal fraction (i.e. 5.82%), but the median level return (i.e. 
exp(0.0552) - 1 = 5.68%) is slightly below the withdrawal fraction, so the shortfall probability rises with age.  
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3.3.2 Shortfall Measures That Incorporate Severity  
 
As Bodie (2001: 308) notes, a major shortcoming of the popular SP risk metric is that it “completely 
ignores how large the potential shortfall might be.” The shortfall probability answers the question 
“how often” consumption falls short, but not “how bad” the loss is if it occurs, under each of the 
different withdrawal rules. To provide information about the potential extent of a shortfall, we next 
calculate the Mean Excess Loss (MEL) as an additional risk measure. Formally this risk metric is 
given by: 
  MEL(Bt)=E[ z – Bt | Bt < z ].  (11) 
It indicates the expected loss with respect to the benchmark, under the condition that a shortfall oc-
curs. Therefore, given a loss, the MEL answers the question “how badly on average” does the strat-
egy perform; it MEL can be characterized as a ‘worst case’ risk measure, which is highly sensitive 
with respect to realisations at the tail of the distribution (i.e. large-scale shortfalls).
 11 
An additional shortfall risk measure that links both the probability and the extent of the con-
ditional shortfall in an intuitive way is the Shortfall Expectation (SE): 
 SE(Bt) = E[max(z - Bt,0)] = MEL(Bt)ּSP(Bt). (12) 
The shortfall expectation is the sum of losses weighted by their probabilities, and hence it is a 
measure of the unconditional “average loss”. As equation (12) shows, the SE is simply the product 
of the shortfall probability and the mean level of shortfall given the occurrence of a shortfall.
12 
 
In Figure 3 we plot the Mean Excess Loss results for the various withdrawal strategies of interest, 
namely the fixed benefit rule, the fixed fraction rule (5.82%), the 1/T approach and the 1/E(T) rule. 
Here we compare the MEL for each tactic versus the annuity benefit.  Results are similar in form: 
that is, in the first year, all strategies but the fixed benefit program have a positive MEL, since the 
fixed benefit approach pays for as long as possible an amount equal to the initial annuity. The 1/T 
rule has a particularly high initial MEL, at 60% of the value of the annuity payment, and this falls 
only to 30% some 15 years into the retirement period. Both the 1/E(T) and the fixed fraction rules 
have 30% MEL profiles through about age 90, but then the 1/E(T) rule confronts the retiree with a 
rapidly rising mean excess loss attaining close to 100% late in life. By contrast, the 1/T plan faces 
the retiree with a gradually declining expected loss after age 90, falling to about 30%. The results 
make clear that from a worst-case risk perspective, the fixed fraction rule, and the 1/E(T) rule, are 
not proper financial instruments for insurance against longevity.  
 
Figure 3 here 
 
                                                 
11 The MEL is closely connected with the Tail Conditional Expectation (TCE), which is given by TCE = E(R R < z) = 
z–MEL. The TCE has some favourable features, e.g. it is (in contrast to the shortfall probability) a coherent risk measu-
re with respect to the axioms developed by Artzner et al. (1999). 
12 In addition, the SE is related to the price of a (derivative) financial contract which allows the annuitant to transfer the 
downside risk of a phased withdrawal plan into the capital market. For example, if the retiree buys a put option paying 
Pt = max(z–Bt, 0) at time t, then he is completely hedged against the risk that the benefit from the withdrawal plan is 
lower than the payment from the benchmark annuity z. Note that the future benefits are directly related to the market 
value of the retirement accounts assets Vt. Using standard arguments from option pricing theory, the price of such a 
(European) put option is given by p0 = EQ[max(z–Bt, 0)]/exp(Rf··t), where EQ denotes the expectation operator with 
respect to the risk adjusted (“martingale”) probabilities and Rf is the risk free interest rate.  
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The profiles for the Shortfall Expectation appear in Figure 4, and it will be recalled that these com-
bine the Shortfall Probability and the Mean Excess Loss, all conditional on survival. This graph 
underscores the patterns revealed by the two previously analyzed risk measures. Now the fixed 
benefit rule has a very low Shortfall Expectation through about age 83, whereas the 1/T rule is ini-
tially the riskiest with a 60% SE. It takes a very long time until the SE of the 1/T rule declines to a 
negligible level – older than age 90 for the hypothetical individual under study. The fixed fraction 
and the 1/E(T) rules have a SE of less than 20% through at least age 80, but the 1/E(T) rule again 
traces out what is perhaps unexpected behavior – after falling to low levels through about age 84, 
the risk begins to rise substantially 20 years after retirement, and it has the highest expected short-
fall for the long-lived individual.  
 
Figure 4 here 
 
 
3.4. Analysis of Expected Bequests 
 
The other side of the story behind these rules is that the retiree must in effect compare his own con-
sumption with the potential value of the bequest that would go to the heirs if he should die. Figure 5 
illustrates the expected bequest under the various formulations, conditional on death. The pattern 
exhibiting most stability is the fixed fraction rule, but the other three are highly divergent. For ex-
ample, the 1/T rule shows an interesting path, first rising in the early retirement period when with-
drawals are small. About 35 years after retirement, however, the expected bequest begins to decline 
very quickly – a fact that is directly attributable to the construction of this plan. The older a retiree 
gets, the more he or she withdraws from his account: thus five years before the plan ends, the retiree 
withdraws 1/5=20% of the remaining wealth. If the retiree should by chance live beyond age 110, 
this approach offers no continued payment or bequest potential. The 1/E(T) rule also offers only a 
very low bequest potential after reaching a limiting age. In contrast with the 1/T rule, however, the 
1/E(T) plan offers lower expected inheritance at every age. Particularly if the retiree does not die 
until 20 years into retirement, the inheritance will decline dramatically.  
 
Figure 5 here 
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4. Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies 
4.1. Optimized Withdrawal Rules in a Risk-Return Context  
 
Thus far, our analysis has assumed that the retiree holds his pension plan assets in a fixed-weight 
portfolio comprised of 50% stocks and 50% bonds over a fixed investment horizon. Thus the pay-
outs during retirement take into account only capital market uncertainty, and there was no possibil-
ity of optimization around risk/reward tradeoffs. In this section, we extend the analysis by including 
a consideration of mortality risk, and further we discuss two additional phased withdrawal rules that 
permit the retiree to optimize the design of the withdrawal patterns. In the next subsection, our 
analysis varies the investment weights of the associated with stock, bonds, and cash investments, to 
attain a “risk-minimizing” static asset allocation. The portfolio weights are therefore determined 
endogenously (excluding short-selling), following Albrecht and Maurer (2002). In the following 
subsection, we go on to examine the impact of mandatory shifting to annuitization at a specific age. 
This is currently required in tax qualified German Riester  plans at the age of 85 and for UK income 
drawdown plans at the age 75. In both countries, the restriction of mandatory switching has already 
considerable criticism in the public debate (c.f. Blake et al. 2003; Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2003b). 
 
To evaluate how the relative ranking of the alternative withdrawal rules might change with an en-
dogenous asset mix in the retiree’s investment fund and other plan design parameters, it is useful to 
define the expected present value of the shortfall, called here “EPVShortfall”: 
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Here, SE(Bt) = E[max(z – Bt, 0)] denotes the expected shortfall with respect to the target z, which is 
equal to the benefit provided by the benchmark life annuity. The possible expected shortfall in year 
t are weighted by the conditional probability tpx that a man aged x at the beginning of the retirement 
phase is still alive, in the case when a shortfall occurs. All possible expected shortfalls are dis-
counted back to the beginning of the retirement period using the risk-free interest rate Rf (i.e. assum-
ing a flat term structure of real interest rates) and summed over the maximum length of the mortal-
ity table used. This useful summary measure of the risk associated with a phased withdrawal strat-
egy may be interpreted as the lump sum premium that would be required for the retiree to transfer 
this shortfall risk to an insurer, assuming actuarially fair pricing and no additional loading.
13 Given 
this function, we minimize it with regard to asset allocation and other plan design parameters, to 
derive the asset allocation patterns most amenable to alternative withdrawal rules.   
 
Previous studies, most notably Milevsky (1998), Milevsky and Robinson (2000) and Albrecht and 
Maurer (2002), approach the issue of optimal fixed benefits withdrawal rules by adopting the crite-
rion of controlling the probability of a consumption shortfall in retirement. On the other hand, as we 
have argued, this perspective does not account for the size of the loss when it happens, which our 
risk measure does. 
 
                                                 
13 Note, if SE(Bt)/(1+Rf)
t is calculated with respect to the corresponding risk adjusted (“martingale”) probabilities (con-
sistent with an arbitrage free capital market) of the underlying asset process, it is consistent with the price of an Euro-
pean put option which pays the difference if a shortfall happens in year t after retirement. Then the EPVShortfall is the 
value of a portfolio consisting of (European) put options weighted by survival probabilities tpx.  
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To extend the approach, we adopt two additional reward measures associated with each optimized 
phased withdrawal strategy, namely, the expected present value of benefits received during life 
(EPVBenefits) and the expected present value of bequests at death (EPVBequest). These are de-
fined, respectively, as: 
  ∑
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Here, the EPVBenefits is similar defined as the money worth concept used by Mitchell et al. (1999) 
and reflects the expected present value of benefit payments conditional on survival. Finally, EB-
VBequest measures the expected present value of the inheritance that the retiree would pass on to 
heirs, in the event of death. 
 
We implement these metrics instead of adopting a specific utility function for several reasons. First, 
these risk measures are consistent with expected utility analysis, since they are the primitives that 
enter into utility maximizers’ objective functions.
14 Any particular functional form must embody 
specific tradeoffs between risk and return components, whereas our approach can remain agnostic 
about the specific weights attached to each (Sarin and Weber 1993). Second, risk minimization is 
consistent with many studies in the literature (c.f. Albrecht and Maurer, 2002;  Chen and Milevsky, 
2003; Milevsky and Robinson, 1994), and it is also consistent with conventional wisdom offered by 
money managers and financial planners when providing advice regarding retirement income pay-
outs (c.f. Ameriks, forthcoming; Ameriks et al., 2001; Ibbotson Associates, 2003).  
 
The specific optimized rules we propose are two: a “Fixed Percent Optimized” rule, and a “1/T Op-
timized” rule. The first (Fixed Percent Optimized) rule minimizes the expected present value of the 
shortfall by selecting jointly the optimal constant withdrawal fraction and the retiree’s asset alloca-
tion. This contrasts from our earlier constant withdrawal rule, by endogenizing the withdrawal frac-
tion. Compared to the non-optimized Fixed Percent rule, we expect that allowing two parameters, 
the fraction consumed as well as the asset allocation, will be more successful in controlling both 
mortality and capital market risk. The second rule, denoted as “1/T Optimized” minimizes the EP-
VShortfall by selecting jointly the maximum duration of the plan conditional on survival, along 
with the asset allocation. We expect that the 1/T Optimized rule will permit more consumption 
when the probability is high that the retiree remains alive, as compared to the non-optimized 1/T 
rule, but it will also offer lower expected bequests.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14 For example, assume that the individual trades off expected benefit payments versus the expected shortfall vis a vis 
the benchmark annuity z, i.e. Φ (Bt)=E(Bt)–kE[max(z–Bt, 0)] with risk aversion parameter k>0 (and ignoring bequests).  
This risk value model is consistent with a utility function suggested by Fishburn (1977) of the form u(x)=x if x≥ z resp. 
u(x)=x–k(z-x) if x<z. As Bawa (1975, 1978) has shown, the mean/SE-optimization model studied here corresponds with 
the concept of second order stochastic dominance. To allow tradeoffs between EPVBenefit and EPVShortfall, we make 
the usual assumption that the individual’s objective function is given by a time separable utility function of the Fishburn 
type, and that the individual’s time preference is equal to the risk-free real interest rate. See also Brachinger and Weber 
(1997) for risk as a primitive.   
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4.2. Comparative Results: Annuity versus Phased Withdrawal Plans  
 
Table 1 reports results for the various withdrawal rules of interest here allowing optimized asset 
allocation. These may be compared to results for the benchmark case of a life annuity benefit which 
appear in Row 1: a 65-year old male who pays €100 for an immediate real annuity will receive an-
nual benefits of €5.82 for life (at the beginning of each year).  By construction, both the EPVShort-
fall and EPVBequest are zero for the annuity purchase; the EPVBenefits measure is slightly below 
€100 due to the annuity load assumed.  In Row 2 we report results for a phased withdrawal program 
where the Fixed Benefit is equal to the annuity at €5.82 as before; of course, the retiree may run 
short of funds since he is not actually annuitizing. The optimized asset allocation associated with 
minimizing the EPVShortfall for this Fixed Benefit withdrawal plan consists of 20% stocks and 
80% bonds, and associated with this plan is an expected shortfall worth €3.58  per €100 of initial 
assets. As long as the retiree lives, he can expect benefits totaling €93.41 (in present value), or about 
4.3% below the real annuity. Of course, on other hand, the bequest his heirs can expect is quite 
large, at €53.2 (or more than half the initial investment). Clearly, unless a retiree had an enormous 
taste for bequests, annuitization would be judged far superior to taking a fixed benefit at 5.82€ per 
annum until the fund is probably exhausted.  Rows 3 and 4 of Table 1 displays results for two Fixed 
Percentage strategies. The first is determined by selecting a Fixed Percentage rule that pays out a 
first-year benefit equivalent to the €5.82 real lifelong annuity purchased by the 65-year old male 
paying €100. Given this constant benefit-wealth-ration (i.e. ω  = 5.82%) we solve for the optimal 
asset mix minimizing the EPVShortfall. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
The second strategy selects a fixed fraction that is now also optimized with regard to EPVShortfall. 
What is different here is that both the asset allocation and the withdrawal fraction is simultaneously 
optimized at the beginning of the retirement phase. These two rows indicate is that, in both cases, 
the risk measured by the EPVShortfall is almost four times as large as under the Fixed Benefit ap-
proach. Offsetting this could be the higher benefit stream conditional on survival and higher bequest 
value to the heirs. Both Fixed Percentage strategies have slightly higher equity exposures (30%) 
than the Fixed Benefit approach (20%). This is in contrast to the high equity exposures recom-
mended by Albrecht and Maurer (2002) and Vora and McGinnes (2000) using a fixed benefit with-
drawal approach. Of course the optimized strategy that permits a fixed percentage payout of 7% of 
the account annually has a lower expected shortfall and higher expected benefits than the non-
optimized strategy. 
 
Next we turn to the two 1/T rules, where again the first simply sets T to the maximum plan duration 
(the oldest age in the mortality table), and optimizing asset allocation with minimizing EPVshort-
fall. The second endogenously evaluates both, the asset allocation and the plan duration that mini-
mizes EPVShortfall.  It is interesting that the simple 1/T rule (Row 5) results in the highest equity 
exposure, and it is also unlikely to be preferred by many:  the size of the expected shortfall is the 
largest of those considered (€35 of the initial €100 asset), and the expected benefits are the lowest 
of those examined. The only clear gainers are likely to be the heirs. We contrast this with the pattern 
that would result from optimizing the maximum plan duration, which the retiree could do if he had 
Social Security or welfare to live on in the event that his asset is extinguished and he is still alive. 
This would occur around age 87, according to the program computed. Row 6 indicates using the 1/T 
rule optimized for asset allocation and the date of running out of assets offers lower risk, higher  
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expected than the annuity, a reasonable bequest, and the asset allocation is not too risky (15% eq-
uity, 75% bonds, and 10% cash).   
 
Finally we examine Row 7 which refers to the 1/E(T) rule, which is consistent with the phased 
withdrawal scheme allowed by the US tax authority for 401(k) pension plans. This is an interesting 
strategy, because it offers quite low expected shortfalls, and 6% higher expected benefits as com-
pared to the life annuity, while still affording a decent bequest potential. The asset allocation im-
plied is rather conservative, with 20% in equity and 80% in bonds. Overall, looking across the 
phased withdrawal plans, there is no clearly dominant strategy, since all involve tradeoffs between 
risk, benefit, and bequest measures, and individual preferences may vary. Nevertheless, the 1/E(T) 
rule seems relatively appealing as compared to the others, as long as the retiree has only a moderate 
appetite for bequests.  
 
The second panel of Table 1 reports results for a female age-65 retiree considering the same phased 
withdrawal patterns. To summarize results, we find that women confront lower expected shortfall 
risks in all cases and can anticipate higher EPVBenefits. This occurs because the lower female mor-
tality translates into a lower initial annuity payment; i.e. her actuarially fair benefit is €5.02 per year 
for a €100 purchase (versus the male payout of €5.82). Consequently, variable withdrawal plans 
have the woman withdraw less early in life, leaving more assets in the fund to earn future capital 
market returns. Since the woman also is expected to live longer, she will more likely be alive to 
reap the fruits of the investment. We would therefore predict, and the results confirm, that the 
1/E(T) rule is more attractive to women than men, since it offers rather low expected shortfalls, and 
15% higher expected benefits as compared to the annuity, while still affording a decent bequest 
potential.  It is also interesting that the asset allocation strategies for women are similar to those for 
men but do have slightly lower equity exposure overall.  
 
Thus far, the analysis has assumed the retiree begins the payout phase at age 65, but it may be of 
interest to explore how the phased withdrawal patterns behave with alternative retirement ages. Ta-
ble 2 displays the findings for a male retiring at age 60 or age 70, which can be directly compared 
with the top panel of Table 1.  What the results show is that the phased withdrawal patterns are un-
ambiguously more attractive for an age 60 retiree, as compared to the 65 year old. In other words, 
all expected shortfall risk measures are lower, expected benefit payouts to the living retirees are 
higher, and expected bequests are similar; the portfolios selected are slightly lighter in equities.  
This is because the mortality drag for the life annuity purchased by a Younger person, and therefore 
the benchmark, is substantially lower. By contrast, the higher mortality faced by a 70-year old re-
tiree produces a higher benchmark annuity which translates into greater EPVShortfalls, lower ex-
pected benefits, and also lower expected bequests. This is despite having 10-15% higher equity ex-
posure. This would lead one to conclude that annuitization would be relatively more appealing to 
older retirees, as compared to phased withdrawal patterns.
15 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Thus far we have assumed that the annuity benchmark is computed in each case using the sex-
specific mortality tables relevant to the individual making the purchase. Nevertheless, in some con-
                                                 
15 Similar conclusions apply to women, though the differences by retirement age are less pronounced; results are avail-
able on request.  
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texts, insurers are required to use a unisex table when selling annuities: for example, this is the case 
in the United States if an annuity is purchased using accruals in an employer-based defined contri-
bution plan (McGill et al., 1996). Likewise in the UK, unisex tables are used to price annuities in 
the Personal Pension arrangements. A unisex mortality table is generated by averaging mortality 
probabilities for men and women at each age.  Naturally, using a unisex table slightly boosts the 
annuity paid to a female retiree and slightly reduces the male’s benefit, as compared to using sex-
specific tables.  Thus when German mortality tables are used to value unisex payouts (as in Appen-
dix A), the payout for a female from a €100 annuity purchase would rise by 7% from €5.02 to 
€5.37, whereas for the male it would decline by 7.7% from €5.82. Using a unisex table for annuiti-
zation would obviously change the benchmark for comparisons with phased withdrawal plans. Yet 
the phased withdrawal plans would still embody the sex-specific mortality patterns relevant to the 
individual decisionmaker. 
 
Results using the unisex table for the annuity benchmark appear in Table 3. The annuity benefit is 
now equal by construction for men and women, at €5.37 annually for a €100 purchase. As a result, 
the female annuitant would clearly do better than she would under the sex-specific table, and the 
male would do worse.  One surprise is that the results are less clearcut under the phased withdrawal 
patterns. For men, expected shortfalls under all withdrawal patterns are lower, expected benefits are 
lower, and bequests are higher. The pattern is the opposite for women: expected shortfalls are 
higher, expected benefits are higher, and bequests lower. Hence when a government requires unisex 
tables for annuity pricing, a woman who elected a phased withdrawal plan would be exposed to 
greater risk.  It is interesting that this might be an unexpected and undesired result for those advo-
cating unisex tables in pension plans. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
 
4.3. Phased Withdrawal Plans with Mandatory Deferred Annuities 
 
The results above suggest that some retirees might prefer to engage in a mixed strategy: that is, to 
undertake phased withdrawals during the early portion of the retirement period, and then to switch 
to an annuity thereafter.  Furthermore, some researchers have suggested that such a mixed strategy 
would be attractive: it enhances the payout early on, in exchange for relatively low risk, and it also 
adds the insurance feature later in life (Blake et al., 2003; Milevsky, 1998). In addition, some gov-
ernments have recently required that the elderly annuitize after a phased income drawdown period. 
For example, in the UK, compulsory annuitization is required at age 75, and German Riester  Plans 
require annuitization at age 85.  
 
To examine the risks and rewards associated with phased withdrawal followed by annuitization at 
some later age, we revisit our calculations under each withdrawal rule, assuming annuitization is 
required if the individual is still alive at either age 75 or 85. Two approaches are considered. In the 
first case, which we call the “switching strategy”, a retiree would follow the relevant phased with-
drawal rule until reaching a mandatory switching age. In all cases, for the benchmark, we use the 
real annuity that the retiree could have purchased at age 65, to compare our new results with prior 
findings.  If, at the switching point, the fund is inadequate to purchase this real annuity, the gap 
represents a shortfall; conversely, if the account holds more than is needed to buy the benchmark 
annuity, this excess can be allocated to increase the bequest or used for higher consumption. In the  
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following, we assume that an excess (if any) is used to increase the level of the annuity starting at 
age 75 or 85, enhancing the EPVBenefits rather than EPVBequest measure. 
 
For the second case, we examine an “immediate purchase deferral strategy”. In this case, the retiree 
purchases an annuity on retirement, with deferred payouts beginning at age 75 (or 85). The deferred 
annuity benefit is set equal to the benchmark that the retiree could have received if he initiated an-
nuity payments at age 65. It is worth noting that it is unclear what one might expect from these 
switching strategies, in terms of risks and rewards. Some analysts suggest that switching may be a 
preferred strategy, relying on the fact that the mortality drag rises with age, so annuities pay out 
more for a given premium, the older one is when purchasing them (Milevsky, 2001). On the other 
hand, this work focuses only on the probability of a shortfall but does not weight the size of the loss, 
conditional on the shortfall occurring.  By delaying annuitization, the retiree can benefit from capi-
tal market returns if they are favourable, so benefit payments can be higher while he lives, or be-
quests higher if he dies. Yet delaying annuitization also exposes him to shortfall risk.  
In Table 4 we indicate findings for a male retiring at age 65, making the decision to switch from a 
phased withdrawal to an annuity at either age 75 (or 85).
16 Comparing results in Panel A of Tables 1 
and 4, we see that if delayed annuitization is available, this generally increases the EPVBenefits and 
shrinks the EPVShortfall, both of which are beneficial. The EPVBequest falls, indicating that the 
deferred annuitization strategy is likely to be most attractive to those seeking to secure consumption 
while alive, without completely stripping the heirs of some promised funds. In other words, the 
risk/return profile of the phased withdrawal plan that includes a delayed annuity is enhanced, as 
compared to no annuity, at the cost of a smaller bequest potential. Also interesting is the fact that 
switching to an annuity later in life (i.e. at age 85; compare panels A and B in Table 4) raises the 
equity share of the portfolio slightly, but greatly enhances the bond exposure. Also, buying the an-
nuity later obviously promise more bequest potential, at the cost of higher shortfall.   
 
Table 4 here 
 
Table 5 displays results for a 65-year old male purchasing a deferred annuity at the beginning of the 
retirement period, with annuity payouts beginning at age 75 (or 85) assuming he is alive.  In con-
trast to the mandatory annuitization strategy, we see that the risk and return profile depends heavily 
on the chosen withdrawal rule. In the case of the 1/T rule combined with a deferred annuity payable 
from age 75, the logical strategy is to consume all remaining wealth using the phased withdrawal 
tactic by age 74, secure in the knowledge that one is protected against longevity risk thereafter.  
This pattern provides a benefit stream worth slightly more than the real annuity, and it offers low 
shortfall risk and low expected bequests. This is an important result since it indicates the advantage 
of allowing flexibility until age 75, paired with protected consumption after that age. Similar results 
hold if the deferred annuity were to begin at age 85, with slightly higher benefit and bequest levels 
at the expense of somewhat higher shortfalls.  By contrast, the 1/E(T) rule combined with a deferred 
annuity at age 75 provides the retiree with relatively low payouts up to age 75, producing a high 
EPVShortfall, but after that age, benefits flow from both the annuity and the phased withdrawal 
plan which raises EPVBenefits (and higher potential bequests). Delaying the annuity payout date to 
age 85 instead of 75 exposes the retiree to much higher shortfall risk, along with higher possible 
wealth for the heirs. 
Table 5 here 
                                                 
16 Results for women are available on request.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Though standard economic models imply that most people would highly value the protection 
against longevity risk that annuitization offers, many retirees do not purchase annuities with their 
disposable wealth. Certainly if older people have no desire to leave a bequest, annuities would seem 
to be strongly preferred. Yet there is evidence that many older people do intend to leave a bequest: 
for instance, Hurd and Smith (1999) find that more than half of the elderly expect to leave a bequest 
worth more than $10,000. As a result, there would seem to be great need for models to guide retir-
ees as they examine tradeoffs between consumption versus the possibility of leaving a bequest. Of 
course such tradeoffs generally require the retired worker to exchange some risk for some return, in 
which case there is a natural role for phased withdrawal programs during the retirement period. 
 
Taking risk and value as primitives is appealing for several reasons (Brachinger and Weber, 1997). 
First, from a descriptive perspective, a risk-value model such as ours is likely to be useful in ex-
plaining retiree preferences by understanding how they trade off expected benefits, bequests, and 
the risk of consumption shortfalls. Second, policymakers and regulators may benefit from evidence 
on the risk-return patterns of different withdrawal options in tax-favored individual retirement 
plans. Of course financial intermediaries offering retirement products such as banks, insurance 
companies, and mutual funds, can use this information to design and market products that have 
typical benefit, bequest, and risk features. Finally, professional financial planers may offer better 
information to their clients when they make retirement investment choices.  
 
Our approach uses the concept of shortfall-risk, whereby the benefits of a life annuity serves as the 
benchmark, building on research by Milevsky (1998, 2001), Milevsky and Robinson (1994, 2000), 
Milevsky et al. (1997) and Albrecht and Maurer (2002). We extend this research in two directions. 
First, we use a risk metric which considers both the probability of a consumption shortfall as well as 
the size of the shortfall when it occurs. Second, we focus not only on phased withdrawal plans with 
fixed benefits, but also on variable benefit patterns in conjunction with a predetermined benefit-to-
wealth ratio. We evaluate several alternative designs for phased withdrawal strategies, investigating 
withdrawal rules while allowing for endogenous asset allocation patterns, and allowing the worker 
to make decisions both about when to retire and when to switch to an annuity.  Of course, selecting 
a specific withdrawal pattern requires further information on utility weights to trade consumption 
against bequests, but many retirees and their financial counselors may find it difficult to articulate 
their utility functions in advance. For this reason we find that it is useful to explore various explicit 
risk and return measures for alternative withdrawal plans in a stochastic environment, allowing for 
randomness in both the time of death and investment returns. 
We conclude the following: 
   Discretionary management of accumulated assets with systematic phased withdrawals for con-
sumption purposes offers many advantages: flexibility, bequests, and possibly higher rates of 
consumption than can be paid by standard life annuities. But following phased withdrawal 
plans also requires the retiree to devote attention to asset allocation and withdrawal rules. 
   Retirees using a phased withdrawal plan who seek to minimize the risk of consuming less than 
the real annuity benchmark will allocate their retirement assets more in fixed income than in 
equities.  Nonetheless, which specific mix is elected must depend on plan design, age, mortal-
ity risk, and other factors. 
   A phased withdrawal strategy paying the same benefit as the annuity exposes one to the risk of 
outliving one’s assets while still alive. A phased withdrawal plan using a fixed benefit-to-
wealth ratio avoids the risk of running out of money, since benefits fluctuate in tandem with  
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the pension fund’s value. But a fixed benefit withdrawal rule affords lower risk than variable 
withdrawal rules, if one uses a mortality-weighted shortfall-risk measure (which includes both 
shortfall probability and magnitude of loss). 
   Mandatory deferred annuitization with a fixed withdrawal rule can enhance expected payouts 
and cut expected shortfall risk but at the cost of reduced expected bequests, as compared to no 
annuity. For a variable withdrawal plan, a simple deferred annuitization may not reduce risk: 
rather, it requires optimization of the benefit to wealth ratio.  
   As a standalone strategy, the 1/E(T) phased withdrawal rule is appealing since it offers rela-
tively low expected shortfall risk, good expected payouts for the retiree during his life, and 
some bequest potential for his heirs. But if mandatory annuities are combined with this phased 
withdrawal plan, the 1/E(T) rule is less attractive. 
   The optimized 1/T rule and the fixed benefit rule both have appealing risk characteristics, par-
ticularly when combined with a mandatory deferred annuity.  
   Unisex mortality tables have been advocated by some who believe they are “fairer” to women 
in annuity calculations. However, we show that if phased withdrawal plans are available as an 
alternative, unsex tables used for annuity pricing can make women’s expected shortfalls 
higher, expected benefits higher, and bequests lower under a phased withdrawal program, as 
compared to annuitization.  
 
These findings have general relevance for national retirement policy. For example, the 1/E(T) rule 
has been adopted by the US tax authority for the “default” withdrawal pattern in private defined 
contribution accounts (401k’s), and our results show that this is a relatively appealing standard in 
the US context where annuitization is not mandatory. We also find that mandating annuitization 
after a phased withdrawal period can be quite appealing in terms of risk, so it is interesting that this 
approach has recently been implemented in both the UK and Germany.  Some degree of mandated 
annuitization has also proposed for the US by the recent Commission to Strengthen Social Security 
in the US context (Cogan and Mitchell, 2003). Our results also imply that a government mandate 
requiring that unisex tables be adopted for annuity pricing (as in the UK) exposes women who 
elected a phased withdrawal plan to greater risk.  Finally, our results have implications for the asset 
mix retirees will optimally want to hold: later annuitization (say, at age 85) would imply a larger 
fraction of the financial assets would be held in bonds.  
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Figure 1: Mean Benefit of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Figure 2: Shortfall Probability of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Figure 3: Mean Excess Loss of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Figure 4: Expected Shortfall of Withdrawal Plan Conditional on Survival 
(50% Equities / 50% Bonds): Life Annuity Benchmark
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Table 1.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies  
Using Sex-specific Mortality Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation: 
Male and Female Retirees 
 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.82 p.a./ €100 
Investment Weights (in %)  Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest  Equity Bonds  Cash 
1. Real Annuity €5.82 0  97.291 0      
2. Fixed Benefit = €5.82 3.579  93.408 53.191 20  80  0 
3. Fixed Pct. = 5.82%  12.582  92.528 66.055 30  70  0 
4. Fixed Pct. Opt ω  = 7.0%  11.303  98.450 52.929 30 70  0 
5. 1/T Rule Age 110  34.953  82.680 134.410 50  50  0 
6. 1/T Rule Opt. Age 87  15.155  104.439 32.997 15  75  10 
7. 1/E(T) Rule  8.271  103.075 39.801 20  80  0 
B. Results for Female (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.02 p.a./ €100 
8. Real Annuity €5.02 0  97.291 0      
9. Fixed Benefit = €5.02  1.507  95.652 54.188 15 65 20 
10. Fixed Pct. = 5.02%  9.246  98.732 70.474 25  75  0 
11. Fixed Pct. Opt ω = 6.1%  7.889  105.382 58.535 25 75  0 
12. 1/T Rule Age 110  26.554  97.951 122.997 40  60  0 
13. 1/T Rule Opt. Age 91  12.279  116.192 32.072 15  75  10 
14. 1/E(T) Rule  5.688  113.469 35.482 15  85  0 
Notes:  
EPV Shortfall: expected present value of future benefit payments below the life annuity (shortfall)  
EPV Bequest: expected present value of future bequest payments 
EPV Payments: expected present value of future benefit payments 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 2.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies  
Using Sex-specific Mortality Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation: 
Male Retirees Only 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 60): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €4.95 p.a/€100 
Investment Weights (in %)  Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest  Equity Bonds  Cash 
Real Annuity €4.95  0  97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit = €4.95  1.734  95.444 57.367 15 70 15 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =6.0%  7.826  105.931 55.863 25 75  0 
1/T Rule Opt Age 88   13.244  116.233 34.711 15  80  5 
1/E(T) Rule  6.051  112.150 38.541 15  85  0 
B. Results for Male (Retirement Age 70): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €7.03 p.a./ €100 
Real Annuity €7.03  0  97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit = €7.03 6.628  90.086 45.104 25  75  0 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =8.5%  15.450  92.839 50.585 40 60  0 
1/T Rule Opt. Age 87  17.601  91.870 30.274 10  60  30 
1/E(T) Rule  11.913  93.692 41.185 25  75  0 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table 3.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies  
Using Unisex Mortality Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation: Male 
and Female Retirees 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Real Life Annuity €5.37 p.a./ €100 
Investment Weights (in %)  Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest  Equity Bonds  Cash 
Real Annuity €5.37 0  89.871 0   
Fixed Benefit €5.37 1.946  87.918 56.332 15  80  5 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =6.6%  8.130  94.569 54.878 25 75  0 
1/T Rule Opt. Age 88  11.588  98.398 34.376 10  65  25 
1/E(T) Rule  5.140  100.679 38.650 15  85  0 
B. Results for Female (Retirement Age 65): Benchmark Life Annuity €5.37 p.a./ €100  
Real Annuity €5.37  0  104.206 0    
Fixed Benefit €5.37 2.776  100.986 51.264 15  85  0 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =6.4%  10.716  109.501 53.819 30 70  0 
1/T Rule Opt Age 91  15.531  118.108 32.643 15  85  0 
1/E(T) Rule  8.567  116.704 36.822 20  80  0 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 4.  Results for Risk-Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies Allowing Switching to 
Life Annuities  
Using Sex-specific Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation and With-
drawal Fraction: Male Retirees Only 
 
A. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 Switching Age 75): Benchmark Real Life Annu-
ity €5.82 p.a./ €100  
Investment Weights (in %)  Strategy EPV 
Shortfall 
EPV 
Benefits 
EPV 
Bequest  Equity Bonds  Cash 
Real Annuity €5.82  0  97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 75  0.934  100.321 12.590 5  25  70 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =6.8%  2.820  104.098 12.595 10 45 45 
1/T Rule Opt Age 83  2.893  103.894 12.814 10  40  50 
1/E(T) Rule  3.210  101.109 13.090 5  35  60 
B. Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 Switching Age 85): Benchmark Life Annuity 
€5.82 p.a./ €100  
Real Annuity €5.82  0  97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 85  2.819  103.425 33.575 15  80  5 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =7.4%  7.400  108.844 32.235 25 75  0 
1/T Rule Opt Age 88  9.521  108.265 35.141 20  80  0 
1/E(T)  Rule  5.406  104.143 31.194 15 75 10 
Note: See Table 1. 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
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Table 5.  Results for Risk Minimizing Phased Withdrawal Strategies with Immediate Pur-
chase of Mandatory Deferred Life Annuities  
Using Sex-specific Tables for Annuity Pricing, Allowing Optimized Asset Allocation and With-
drawal Fraction, Male Retirees Only 
 
Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 annuity deferred up to Age 75): Benchmark Real 
Life Annuity €5.82 p.a./ €100  
Investment Weights (in %)  Strategy EPV- 
Shortfall 
EPV- 
Benefits 
EPV- 
Bequest  Equity Bonds  Cash 
Real Annuity €5.82  0  97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 75  0.55  97.426 3.606 5  15  80 
Fixed Pct. Opt ω =15.3%  9.267  106.984 8.457 50 50  0 
1/T-Rule Opt Age 74  1.242  99.810 3.590 5  20  75 
1/E(T) Rule  21.773  121.689 31.474 85  15  0 
Results for Male (Retirement Age 65 annuity deferred up to Age 85): Benchmark Life 
Annuity €5.82 p.a./ €100  
Real Annuity €5.82  0  97.291 0    
Fixed Benefit until 85  1.850  101.352 20.551 10  55  35 
Fixed  Pct. Opt ω = 8.7%  11.008  104.750 34.698 35 65  0 
1/T-Rule Opt Age 84  7.074  106.822 21.387 15  85  5 
1/E(T) Rule  10.624  102.280 34.094 20  80  0 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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 Appendix A: Determining Annuity Benefits 
 
Using the actuarial principle of equivalence, we estimate the gross single premium of the annuity by 
calculating the present value of expected benefits paid to the annuitant including provider expense 
loadings (i.e. commissions and administration fees). Formally, the annuity benefits paid in advance 
of each year until death are given according to the following equation 
  .
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B   (A1) 
Here Rf denotes the (deterministic) interest rate used by the insurance company to discount future 
expected cash flows, tpx the conditional probability that a man aged x will attain age x+t with re-
spect to a mortality table (with maximum age l), and 1+λ  is the expense loading factor. To calculate 
the annuity benefits for females, the tpx in equation (A1) must be substituted with the sex specific 
survival probabilities tpy for females. In the case when a unisex table is used, the survival probabili-
ties are calculated using a specific mortality table for females. 
 
Explicit assumptions must be made about mortality risk, the annuitant’s age, the interest rate used 
by the insurance company to discount expected benefit payments, and the cost structure of the in-
surance company. Following Albrecht and Maurer (2002), we take into consideration the basic an-
nuitant mortality table DAV 1994 R for the specification of the demographic parameters. This table 
is provided by the German Society of Actuaries and is widely used in the German annuities market. 
The table offers sex-specific mortality rates qx (qy) for male and female. From these sex specific 
mortality rates we construct the mortality rates of a unisex table as a weighted average of qx and qy. 
The interest rate used to discount expected annuity payments is set to an annual real 1.5%, consis-
tent with the current yield of Euro-based inflation-linked bonds. Regarding the cost-structure of the 
insurance company, it is assumed that the total expense loading relative to the pure actuarial pre-
mium is 2.785%, i.e. λ  = 1.02785.  
 
Given these assumptions, table A1 shows the yearly benefits (adjusted for inflation and before per-
sonal income taxes) a retiree with age 60, 65 and 70 would receive per 100 EUR of premium. 
 
Table A1.  Immediate Annual Life-long Real Annuity Benefits per EUR 100 Single Premium: 
Total Expense Loadings 2.785%; Discount Factor 1.5%; DAV R 94 Mortality Tables 
 
Mortality Table  Male  Female  Unisex 
Retirement Age  Life Annuity € p.a. 
60  4.9480 4.3215 4.6063 
65  5.8177 5.0174 5.3738 
70  7.0330 5.9900 6.4421 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix B: Determining Expected Benefits, Expected Bequest and the Risk of a Consump-
tion Shortfall for Phased Withdrawal Plans with given Benefit-to-Wealth Ratios 
 
 
Let ω t = Bt/Vt (t = 0, 1, ..,) be a predetermined sequence of benefit-to-wealth ratios 0 ≤  ω t ≤  1, and 
define  ) 1 (
0
i
t
i
t c ω ω ∏
=
− = . The retirement accounts assets (adjusted for inflation) used to fund the 
variable pension benefits Bt are assumed to follow a geometric random walk with drift. This implies 
that the real log returns It over the year are serially independent and identically normal distributed 
with given mean µ and volatility σ. Given an initial endowment V0 at the beginning of the retire-
ment phase, the market value of the retiree’s account at the beginning of year t (t = 1, 2, …) just 
before the withdrawal Bt for that year is made: 
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Vt is distributed log-normally, i.e. ln(Vt) ~ N(mt, v²t) follows a normal-distribution with mean mt = 
ln[cω t-1 V0] + tµ  and variance  ².
2 σ t vt = Consequently, the benefit payments Bt at the beginning of 
each period: 
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are also log-normally distributed, i.e. ln(Bt) ~ N(nt, v²t) with parameters nt = ln[ω t cω t-1 V0] + tµ . 
With these formulas in hand, and additional assumptions about the expected return µ  and volatility 
σ of the retirement accounts assets, it is possible to compute for the variable phased withdrawal 
rules - i.e. fixed fraction, 1/T and 1/E(T) - various risk and return measures of future benefits if the 
retiree is alive as well as the possible bequest in the case he dies. 
 
The expected benefit payments E[Bt] in each period t = 0, 1, … are given by: 
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and the expected bequest if the retiree dies in period t = 1, 2, … according to: 
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The shortfall probability that the benefits from a variable withdrawal plan is lower than a target an-
nuity z can be calculated as:  
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where  Φ  is the cumulative density function of the Standard Normal Distribution at the point 
. / ) ( t m z q t t σ − =  Using the results given in Winkler et al., (1972) the shortfall expectation is: 
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Finally, combining (B5) and (B6) the Mean Excess Loss can be computed as: 
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Appendix C:  Summary Statistics for Real Annual Log-Returns (before tax) on Stocks and 
Bonds in the German Capital Market 1967-2002 
 
Correlations  Asset Class  Mean return 
(% p.a) 
Volatility 
(% p.a.)  Stocks Bonds Cash 
Stocks 5.53  25.36  1     
Bonds 3.98  5.21  0.235  1  
Cash 2.84  1.69  -0.174  0.326  1 
Source: Authors’ calculations; CFS Working Paper Series: 
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